*** Hot Topics
Quantum3D Announces Obsidian2 Voodoo2 Based Products for Game
Enthusiast
(March 13)
Quantum3D has announced the Obsidian2 family of 3D accelerators
based on the Voodoo2 chipset from 3Dfx. Quantum3D is introducing
both new consumer and professional models. Designed to address
the growing market for "game extremists" and priced
competitively against other Voodoo2 based offerings, the new
consumer level Obsidian2 products incorporate many of the design
innovations pioneered by Quantum3D for the professional realtime
3D market including AGP support, simultaneous TV-out, Single
Board Scan Line Interleaving (SBSLI) and up to 24MB of on-board
memory. The new models represent the highest-performance,
consumer-oriented Voodoo2 based products available in the market
today.
The Obsidian2 product family consists of seven different models.
The new Obsidian2 "S/X" models include the S-12, S-12 AGP, and
S-12 AGP TV-each with 12MB of total on-board memory, and the X-
16 and X-24 with 16 and 24MB of memory respectively.
The X-series products utilize the Single Board Scan Line
Interleaved (SBSLI), without requiring dual graphics boards (and
associated PCI slots) and inter-board SLI interconnection
cabling assemblies.
All of the S and X series products are PCI-based except for the
S-12 AGP models. With the exception of the S-12 AGP, all of the
S and X series products also include simultaneous TV-out, which
provides gamers with the ability to play games on large screen
PAL or NTSC monitors in either composite or S-video formats.
The Obsidian2 models employ a "VGA pass-through design" that
ensures compatibility with popular 2D/3D primary windows
accelerators.
On an Intel Pentium(R) II 333MHz system running id Software's
Quake-II benchmark, "Demo 1," the X-16 and X-24 achieve 84.4
frames per second at 1024x768 resolution-the highest of any
product benchmarked to date.
The Obsidian S-12 models employ a 3-chip Voodoo2 chipset with a
196-bit memory architecture that produces 2.2 GB/sec of
dedicated graphics memory bandwidth. The X-16 and X-24 with
SBSLI architecture have a 6-chip Voodoo2 chipset arrayed in a
parallel configuration, with a 382-bit memory architecture that
produces 4.4 GB/sec of dedicated graphics memory bandwidth.
The S-series and X-series models can sustain 90 or 180
Megapixels-per-second of textured fill rate, respectively, with
perspective-correct trilinear texture filtering with per-pixel
level-of-detail mip mapping, z-buffering, alpha-blending, and
per pixel fog enabled.
The Obsidian2 family utilize Voodoo2's floating point triangle
set-up engine that supports triangle meshes, strips, and fans.
This enables the Obsidian2 models to process up to 2.5 million
perspective correct, textured triangles per second. The
Obsidian2 S-12 AGP benefits from the Voodoo2's triangle
performance since its AGP bus interface enables the product to
receive triangle and texture data from the PC's processor at the
rate of 264 Megabytes per second -- twice the rate of 33 MHz
PCI-based Voodoo2 products.
Pricing for the new Obsidian2 line starts at $329 for the
Obsidian2 S-12 PCI. The S-12 AGP is priced at $349 and the S-12
AGP TV is priced at $399. The SBSLI X-16 and X-24 models are
priced at $599 and $699, respectively.
The game extremist products, along with Quantum3D's Obsidian
200SB-8440 for professional realtime 3D applications, also
announced today, will be available directly from Quantum3D
through the company's new Web Store and through authorized
resellers and retailers starting in late April. Obsidian2
products will also be made available in Europe through
authorized distributors.
www.quantum3d.com.
3Dlabs and TI Settle Pending Litigation
(March 26)
3Dlabs Inc., Ltd. and Texas Instruments announced that they have
entered into a definitive agreement to expand their PERMEDIA 2
business relationship. Under the terms of the new agreement,
which modifies the existing licensing arrangement between 3Dlabs
and TI, both companies will continue to aggressively market and
support the PERMEDIA 2 product line. This new agreement is
expected to enable both companies to increase the already
significant penetration of the PERMEDIA 2 product line into the
world-wide PC graphics markets. 3Dlabs and TI have also agreed
to settle all the pending litigation between the two companies
out of court.
www.3dlabs.com
www.ti.com
NVIDIA Will Vigorously Defend Itself in Alleged SGI Lawsuit
(April 9)
NVIDIA Corporation today announced that it has received a copy
of a press release alleging a patent infringement lawsuit filed
in U.S. District Court in Delaware, from SGI, involving NVIDIA's
RIVA series of 3D processors.
"We believe this action is motivated by the loss of some of the
best 3D architects in the world to NVIDIA Corporation," said
Jen-Hsun Huang, president and CEO of NVIDIA. "These people had
no involvement in the design of NVIDIA's current RIVA graphics
processors which are the subject of the alleged patent
infringement. NVIDIA is prepared to vigorously defend itself."
Microsoft: Hopelessly Truth - Challenged
(April 13)
As reported from ZDNet News on April 13, 1998 by Charles Cooper
News flash: Former Nixon henchman H.R. Haldeman links up with
Inspector Clouseau -- and they're both working for Microsoft.
How else to explain Microsoft's consideration of a harebrained
idea to orchestrate a 'spontaneous' outpouring of public support
for its escalating battle against the U.S. Justice Department
and a dozen attorneys general? The only other explanation is
that somebody in Redmond is inhaling -- and in a big way.
Seems that Microsoft, fearing it was losing public sympathy,
came up with one winner of a plan: let's plant articles and
letters to the editor and pass them off as "spontaneous
testimonials" by local firms, according to the Los Angeles
Times, which broke the story last Friday.
Shades of Claude Rains, but I can't confess that I was shocked.
After all, this is the way hardball gets played in the big
leagues and Microsoft knows the other side led by Messrs
Barksdale and Reback -- not to mention Orrin Hatch -- is not
going to give it any quarter.
People are so dazzled by Microsoft's mastery over the software
industry that it's easy to forget the company is still an
amateur in the world of politics. In fact, the company remains
of two minds about how best to blunt negative PR critics attach
to its motives.
"The legal folks want to handle it as a strict legal problem and
say 'no comment' to almost everything," according to one
knowledgeable Microsoft source. "The business folks understand
that it's really something tried in the court of public
opinion."
"The legal guys tend to control things early, leaving the
opposing side to set the tone and agenda and get a big early
lead -- and then Microsoft has to play catch-up," the source
said.
That's why any ham-handed attempt to put in the Big Fix would
rate as one of its dumbest-ever moves. With ambitious state and
federal careerists drooling about nailing a few yuppie hides to
the wall, a story about Microsoft pulling strings from behind a
curtain is bound to be pure catnip to the trust-busters.
Since late last year, Microsoft has tried to shuck its bully-boy
image and pursue a charm offensive. In speeches and interviews,
the party line was that Microsoft's only offense was being too
successful. While the image makers went for the kinder, gentler
spin, Microsoft muzzled company big mouths, like Steve Ballmer,
preventing repeat performances of the time he blurted out "to
heck with Janet Reno" in front of a reporter.
Meanwhile, the peripatetic Bill Gates was seemingly everywhere -
- doing golf commercials, cooing "Twinkle, Twinkle, Little Star"
to his baby on national television, singing the blues on Capitol
Hill. In other words, hey, he's just a regular Joe who likes
software a lot.
I thought the campaign had been fairly effective -- until the
L.A. Times disclosure. Now, Edelman Public Relations, the
outside consulting firm that developed the proposal for
Microsoft, will get a chance to really earn its pay.
More on the Court Ruling Against Intel
(April 14)
James Love of the Consumer Project on Technology made available
the following from the Federal Court decision against Intel.
Because of its significant we provide the text.
In a decision with broad relevance to Microsoft and the
biotechnology sector, Edwin L. Nelson a US Federal District
Court judge from Birmingham, Alabama, issued a decision on April
10, 1998, declared Intel's CPU an "essential facility," and
ordered significant non-discriminatory licensing of Intel's
proprietary information to Intergraph, a firm which sells
graphics chips and technical software, and workstations.
The decision is on the Web at:
www.intergraph.com/intel/order.htm
Here are a few high points from the 80 page decision:
On Intel's market power:
Intel has purposely changed its CPU architecture by using
proprietary sockets and otherwise, converting from the
previously "open architecture" to a new "closed architecture."17
(Tr. 85). This "closed architecture," for practical purposes,
allows Intel, by exercising its intellectual property rights in
its "closed architecture," to wield absolute power over who will
and who will not be allowed to participate in that part of the
high-end computer industry that is based upon the "x86"
microprocessor. Inasmuch as it requires two or more years and
millions of dollars to design and develop a mother board and
graphics subsystem to accept and take advantage of a CPU such as
the Pentium II or any possible alternative, (Tr. 69)18 OEMs,
such as Intergraph, who rely entirely on Intel for their supply
of microprocessors and chip sets have become technologically and
financially locked in to the Intel CPU, its associated chip
sets, and the P6 Bus, and they have no feasible alternative to
it..
.OEMs, such as Intergraph, are capable of competing in the
marketplace only if they also have access to: (1) Intel’s
advance confidential technical information, which is necessary
to develop new products and to service existing products; (2)
advance samples of Intel’s development chips, which are needed
by Intergraph to develop its own next-generation products using
those chips (hereinafter referred to as "Chips Samples"); and
(3) early releases of Intel chips, related products, and related
technical information, which is necessary for Intergraph to test
and produce its products (hereinafter referred to as "Early
Release Chips").
4. Intel Use of NDAs to Coerce Intergraph.
Intel provides its products, as well as technical and design
information, to Intergraph under NDAs, which are terminable at
will by Intel. These NDAs are documents drafted by Intel and
presented to Intergraph and other customers on a take-it-or-
leave-it basis. Intel simply dictates the terms under which it
provides its products and design information to customers such
as Intergraph. (Patterson Tr. 128-130).
The evidence suggests strongly that Intel has used the
threatened or actual termination of NDAs as a contractual
weapon, coercing customers such as Intergraph to accede to
Intel's demands and restraining competition. The court takes
judicial notice of the fact that, when Intergraph and Digital
Equipment separately asserted their patent rights against Intel,
Intel immediately used the termination provisions of their
respective NDAs to deny both Intergraph and Digital further
technical information, samples, and products and demanded the
return of all Intel confidential information provided to them. .
. .
In view of Intel’s previous policy of providing much of the same
type of information now subject to NDAs in a much less
restricted manner and in view of the fact that Intel has offered
no reasonable explanation of any present need for the use of the
NDAs, it seems reasonable to conclude that Intel's present use
of one sided and terminable-at-will NDAs and its retaliatory
cancellation of the NDAs are unreasonable and anticompetitive
contractual restraints using Intel’s monopoly in CPUs and
related design and technical information. Furthermore, the
chilling effect which Intel’s arbitrary enforcement of the NDAs
in this manner must have on other members of the industry, who
are dependent upon Intel for microprocessors, is obvious.
The court also finds that Intel has attempted to leverage its
monopoly power in the "x86" CPU market to prevent Intergraph
from competing in the graphics subsystem and workstation markets
and to control and dominate competition in these markets through
discriminatory and favored agreements and understandings with
some of Intergraph’s competitors. This reduces competition in
the markets in which Intergraph competes, depriving customers of
alternative and improved technology in these markets, stifling
innovation, reducing competition in price and quality, and
impairing competition generally.
B. Intel's Unlawful Refusal to Deal and Denial of Access to
Essential Facilities.
A refusal to deal "may be unlawful because a monopolist’s
control of an essential facility (sometimes called a
“bottleneck”) can extend monopoly power from one stage of
production to another, and from one market into another." MCI
Communications Co. v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081, 1132 (7th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891, 104 S. Ct. 234, 78 L. Ed. 2d 226
(1983). Courts have held that the antitrust laws protect
customers and purchasers in cases when a monopolist refuses to
deal in order to control a downstream market or to frustrate
litigation. Image Technical Services, 125 F.3d at 1211
(supplier’s refusal to deal with its "customers" in order to
control a downstream market); Bergen Drug Co. v. Parke, Davis &
Co., 307 F.2d 725, 726 (3d Cir. 1962) (preliminary injunction
granted where defendant drug company refused to sell its
products to "purchasers" on the same terms as they are sold to
other purchasers).
The antitrust laws impose on firms controlling an essential
facility the obligation to make the facility available on non-
discriminatory terms. MCI Communications Co., 708 F.2d at 1132;
Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 93 S. Ct.
1022, 35 L. Ed. 2d 359 (1973), reh’g denied, 411 U.S. 910, 93 S.
Ct. 1523, 36 L. Ed. 2d 201 (1973); Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen
Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 105 S. Ct. 2847, 86 L. Ed.
2d 467 (1985) (access to essential facility must be granted by
ski lift owner controlling seventy-five percent of the ski
lifts); Tic-X-Press, Inc. v. Omni Promotions Co. of Ga., 815
F.2d 1407, 1420 (11th Cir. 1987) (Omni arena was unique facility
with substantial economic advantages; lack of viable alternative
arenas gave the owner substantial market power).
Intel’s advanced CPUs and Intel’s technical information are
"essential" if they are vital to competitive viability and
competitors cannot effectively compete in the relevant market
without access to them. City of Anaheim v. Southern Calif.
Edison Co., 955 F.2d 1373, 1380 n.5 (9th Cir. 1992) (a facility
is "essential" if it is otherwise unavailable and cannot be
"reasonably or practically duplicated"). Intel’s Advanced Chips
Samples, Early Release Chips and Technical Information need not
be indispensable, but their denial must "impose a severe
handicap on potential market entrants." TCA Bldg. Co. v.
Northwestern Resources Co., 873 F. Supp. 29, 39 (S.D. Tex.
1995).
Reasonable and timely access to critical business information
that is necessary to compete is an essential facility. Bellsouth
Adver. & Publ’g Corp. v. Donnelley Info. Publ’g, Inc., 719 F.
Supp. 1551, 1566 (S.D. Fla. 1988), aff’d, 933 F.2d 952 (11th
Cir. 1991). Furthermore, a Monopolist’s unilateral refusal to
deal violates section 2 of the Sherman Act where such conduct
unreasonably handicaps competitors or harms competition. Image
Technical Services, 125 F.3d at 1209.
Accordingly, the court concludes that Intel’s refusal to supply
advanced CPUs and essential technical information to Intergraph
likely violates section 2 of the Sherman Act, because they are
not available from alternative sources and cannot be feasibly
duplicated, and because competitors cannot effectively compete
in the relevant markets without access to them. Moreover, the
court concludes that Intel has no legitimate business reason to
refuse to deal with Intergraph. Intergraph has been a loyal and
beneficial customer of Intel. The dispute over Intergraph's
patent claims could be resolved separately without Intel denying
Intergraph the essential CPUs and technical information it
needs.
VII. Preliminary Injunction.
Accordingly, pending further order of the court, it is hereby
Ordered, Adjudged, and Decreed:
Intel Corporation, its officers, agents, servants, employees,
and attorneys, and anyone acting in concert with any of them,
shall be and they hereby are PRELIMINARY ENJOINED from
terminating Intergraph’s rights as a "strategic customer in
current and future programs," or from otherwise taking any
action adversely affecting Intel’s business relationship with
Intergraph or Intergraph’s ability to design, develop, produce,
manufacture market or sell products incorporating, or based
upon, Intel products or information, including but not limited
to the following:
a. Intel shall supply Intergraph with all Intel product
information, including but not limited to technical, design,
development, defect, specification, support, supply, future
product, product release or sample data, whether existing in
product data books, "yellow backs," Confidential Information
Transmittal Records, email or other mediums (hereinafter
"Information"), in such form and content as supplied to and at
the same time Intel supplies such Information to Intergraph’s
similarly situated competitors, such as Hewlett Packard, Compaq,
Dell, IBM, NetPower and Silicon Graphics (hereinafter "the
Competitors"), whether it is on an advance basis for the
development of motherboards, graphics subsystems or workstations
utilizing Intel’s existing, or future generation products
(hereinafter "Product Development"), on current products as
needed for support of such products. Intel shall be required to
maintain a log of the disclosure of Information to Intergraph
and its similarly situated Competitors, and upon request of the
court, certify to this court its compliance with the procedures
and timely delivery of such Information.
b. Intel shall supply to Intergraph all Information of the
type or content made available by Intel to Intergraph through
third parties (hereinafter "Third Party Information"), at the
same time it permits, or provides, the disclosure of such Third
Party Information to Intergraph’s similarly situated
Competitors, whether it is on an advance basis for Product
Development or on a current basis for the support of products in
distribution. Intel shall be required to maintain a log of the
disclosure of Third Party Information to Intergraph and its
Competitors, and upon request of the court, certify to this
court its compliance with the procedures and timely delivery of
such Information.
c. Intel shall supply Intergraph with an allocation, and set
aside a supply of microprocessors, semiconductors, chips, and
buses (hereinafter "Chips") on an advance basis for product
development ("Chips Samples"), in such quantities as forecasted
by Intergraph in the same manner and the same terms as is done
by Intergraph’s similarly situated Competitors, or in
proportional quantities as supplied to Intergraph’s similarly
situated Competitors, and at the same time Intel supplies such
Chips Samples to Intergraph’s similarly situated Competitors, at
the prevailing rate charged to Intergraph’s similarly situated
Competitors. Intel shall be required to maintain a log of the
release, or delivery, of Chips Samples to Intergraph and its
Competitors, and upon request of the court, certify to this
court its compliance with the procedures and delivery of such
Chips Samples.
d. Within eleven (11) days of the date on which Intergraph
posts the bond, as required by subsection (h) of this order,
Intel shall supply Intergraph with 25 sets of Deschutes Chips
Samples, together with all technical data needed to permit
Intergraph to develop, design, and manufacture its products.
Such technical data shall be of the same type, nature, and
extent of technical data provided to Intergraph’s similarly
situated Competitors.
e. Intel shall supply Intergraph with an allocation, and set
aside a supply, of Chips which have been manufactured by or on
behalf of Intel for distribution (hereinafter "Production
Chips"), as well as all future chips proposed by, or available
from Intel, including but not limited to 333mhz Pentium II, BX,
Deschutes and Merced Chips, in accordance with a forecast
supplied by Intergraph. Intergraph shall provide Intel with a
forecast for Production Chips at least one (1) quarter in
advance of the quarter in which Intergraph desires to receive
delivery of such Production Chips.
(i) Intel shall supply its authorized distributors with
sufficient quantities of Production Chips to fulfill
Intergraph’s allocation of Production Chips, when such
allocation has been presented by Intergraph to Intel’s
authorized distributor for fulfillment. Intergraph shall, as it
has agreed to do, purchase Production Chips available through
Intel’s authorized distributors by placing an order for such an
authorized distributor to fulfill Intergraph’s Production Chips
allocation. Intergraph shall negotiate the terms and conditions
for the supply of its Production Chips allocation with any Intel
authorized distributor of its choosing, and Intel shall not take
any action, or fail to take any action, that will interfere with
or effect Intergraph’s terms, conditions, negotiations or
relationship with the Intel authorized distributor selected by
Intergraph, including but not limited to actions pertaining to
prices, discounts, volumes, shipping or delivery pertaining to
such Production Chips. Intel shall be required, upon request of
the court, to certify to this court its compliance with the
procedures with the applicable authorized distributor and
delivery of such Production Chips.
(ii) Intel shall supply Intergraph with Production Chips
not yet available from Intel’s authorized distributors ("Early
Production Chips") in such quantities as forecasted by
Intergraph, or in proportional quantities as supplied to
Intergraph’s similarly situated Competitors, at the same time
Intel supplies such Early Production Chips to Intergraph’s
similarly situated Competitors, at the prevailing rate charged
to Intergraph’s similarly situated Competitors. Intel shall be
required to maintain a log of the simultaneous release, or
delivery, of Early Production Chips to Intergraph and its
similarly situated Competitors, and upon request of the court
certify to this court its compliance with the procedures and
delivery of such Early Production Chips. Notwithstanding the
foregoing, Intel shall supply Intergraph those Early Production
Chips ordered by Intergraph for the 1st Quarter of 1998 at the
prices previously agreed to by the parties.
[snip]
James Love
Consumer Project on Technology
P.O. Box 19367, Washington, DC 20036
love@cptech.org | http://www.cptech.org
(202)387-8030
(202)234-5176 FAX
Wave Issue 9810 4/20/98 Article 1-01